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Grasping the Gesture
Replies to Colapietro, Girel, Guglielminetti, Pihlström and Santaella
Giovanni Maddalena
“Comprendre est en attraper le geste, et pouvoir
continuer”
(J. Cavaillès)
“The general theory of signs fails essentially
if it does not encompass a philosophical account of
gesture” 
(Colapietro 2016: 170)
1 Let me first thank Rosa M. Calcaterra and Roberto Frega, co-directors of the European
Journal  of  Pragmatism  and  American  Philosophy,  who  were  so  kind  to  organize  this
symposium. I  also thank all  contributors and Matteo Santarelli  who edited the whole
work. It is a great honor to me that such distinguished scholars dedicated some thoughts
to my work. I am glad also to see such a wide range of comments. I will divide my short
responses in three parts. The first focuses on the critique to Kant’s criticism. The second
deals with the topic of complete gestures. The third, which includes paragraphs 3, 4, and
5, responds to some scattered questions on the paradigm that I propose. There is no room
to answer appropriately to many interesting points raised by friends and distinguished
colleagues,  therefore my answers  have to  be  taken more as  notes  for  further  useful
dialogues  with  people  committed  to  “the  communal  endeavor  of  deepening
understanding  of  phenomena,  at  once,  utterly  commonplace  and  deeply  significant”
(Colapietro 2016: 159).
 
1. On Scholarship and Kant’s Project
2 Let us start with Kant’s project and let  me answer first  to Pihlstrom’s charge of  not
having  being  accurate  as  far  as  Kant/Peirce  scholarship  is  concerned.  Among  many
interesting notations, with which I will be dealing soon, Pihlstrom holds that I did not pay
attention to literature about Kant and pinpoints Gava and Stern’s project as example of
this literature about Kant and Peirce. I do not blame him. It is up to the author to take the
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attention of his readers and, as Daniel Pennac says, it is the right of the reader to abandon
a book.1 So, I think I did not succeed in keeping Sami’s attention beyond the introduction
and the first Chapter, otherwise he would have notice that I did pay attention exactly to
Gava’s work on Peirce and Kant, and more in general to Kant’s scholarship.2 Gava’s work
is quoted several times and my disagreement with Gava’s reading of Peirce is stated in
endnote 11 at page 167 and in endnote 8 at page 171. Moreover, Pihlstrom would have
noticed that the rather vague sentences in the introduction have a very technical sequel
in Chapter 2, completely dedicated to Hanna’s reading of Kant, and in Chapter 8, as Girel
notices in its accurate piece. I would have liked to discuss those technical passages with
such a careful Kantian reader as Sami Pihlstrom. I must hope this will happen another
time, if this reply moves any interest in him to complete the reading of the book.
3 More seriously, Sami Pihlstrom real objection goes hand in hand with some of Enrico
Guglielminetti’s  and Vincent  Colapietro’s  remarks  on  the  risks  of  abandoning  Kant’s
project as such. Here we should be clear about two different perspectives: the philological
one and interpretative one.
4 As for philology, I think there is little doubt about the general anti-Kantism of classic
pragmatists. I am glad to see that also Pihlstrom recognizes that pragmatists “did reject
Kant’s strict apriorism and the unknowability of the thing in itself, among many other
Kantian ideas” (Pihlstrom 2016: 184). I reported that attitude in Chapter 1, and in doing
so, I even omitted some of the harshest criticisms.3 In this respect, Peirce is certainly the
more problematic author among pragmatists, since he took his first steps in philosophy
from Kantism. However, I learnt many years ago from Vincent Colapietro and from deep
studies on Peirce’s late manuscripts, that Peirce did change his position and, as Vincent
says in his article, it was a “truly a decisive shift, a fateful rupture” (Colapietro 2016: 162).
5 In my first Chapter,  I  really wanted to clarify that this anti-Kantism is philologically
evident  in  the  classic  pragmatists.  Sometimes,  this  obvious  evidence  is  voluntary
obscured  by  scholars  because  this  anti-Kantism  turns  pragmatism  into  a  radical
alternative  to  the  philosophies  that  the  Western  world  proposed  for  the  past  two
centuries.  Classic pragmatists were men of science, friends of technological novelties,
critical thinkers, but they were so in a deeply original way. They offered an alternative
view  of  modernity,  very  far  from  nominalisms  and  dualisms  that  often  affect
contemporary philosophy. It is a way in which aesthetics and ethics have a real impact on
logic, in which we have to “break out of the circle of words” (Colapietro 2016: 167), in
which tradition and education have to be understood in a richer way.
6 In the internal debate of the pragmatist scholarship in the late years as well as in the
broader philosophical landscape, I witnessed the growth of a poor realism, very similar to
a simple naturalistic and scientistic view. A reading of Peirce as ancestor and emendator
of the analytic tradition is often allied to this neo-scientist view of reality and science. Of
course, I do not want to deny any merit of both Kant and analytic philosophy. I think we
owe both of them many decisive steps of our civilization, which is useless to list here. Nor
have I thought to get rid of any fruit borne from this tradition of thought. I am only
underlying that Kant, idealism, analytic philosophy helped only one part of our reasoning
to grow: the analytic one; whereas, beyond any intention, they built up weak synthetic
paradigms, often based on the analytic model. This is indeed the content of Chapter 2 in
which I accept Hanna’s thesis on the reliance of Kant’s synthesis on the model of analysis.
I  would  say  that  this  model  of  analysis  remains  in  the  conception of  reason of  the
majority of those who elaborated epistemologies during the last two centuries. That is
Grasping the Gesture
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-1 | 2016
2
why, to give an answer to Vincent’s question about Hegel, I would hold that also Hegel’s
profound  and  inspiring  transformation  falls  under  the  same  Kantian  conception  of
reasoning, even though he pushes it very far into the direction I want to take.
7 In answering Guglielminetti’s and Colapietro’s worries about the abandonment of Kant’s
project, I reply that I do not want to fall into pre-modernity or anti-modernity (nor into
irrationalism), but it is time to rethink an adequate view of reason in which synthesis is
thought in a richer, original way. A different account of the paradigm of reasoning that
presides over synthesis – along with a paradigm for vague reasoning – would complete
the picture of our reasoning. Therefore, I do not want to abandon Kant’s project as such
but to consider it only as a part of our knowledge and, possibly, to smoothen its rigidity.
Differently from Colapietro and Wittgenstein (but I will come back to this later on), I do
not think it is sufficient to have a methodology of our use of reasoning. This strategy
amounts still to accept a difference between theory and practice and to privilege the first
over the latter, evacuating one the most important pragmatist insightful anti-dualisms,
the one which denies the distinction theory-practice. In order to come up with a different
synthetic pattern we also need a formal epistemic pattern and the heart of the book The
Philosophy of Gesture is the need for a rationale of a synthetic and a vague part of our
reasoning.
8 One can say with Pihlstrom – and with many other very interesting Kantian readers as
Gava, Spinicci, Esposito, Baggio (all people with whom I discussed my project during the
last years in different international conferences) – that the real Kant is not the Kant of
the Critique of Pure Reason and that his project was not dualist at all. If the center of it all
were the Third Critique, you would have a very different picture. Fair enough, but I would
reply that, at least, classic pragmatists had in mind the dualist Kant that emerges from
the First Critique and they forged pragmatism according to this reading of Kant. Second,
if Kant really thought of a non-rationalist way of thinking… well, pragmatically speaking,
many consequences of his thought do not agree with this reading.
9 As for  the  interpretative  path,  a  good question by  Sami  Pihlstrom remains:  can the
project of the book work without this anti-Kantian part? No, it cannot. The project wants
to say that we developed only the analytic part of our rationality and that the pragmatist
call to the unity between theory and practice, reasoning and action was an appeal for a
different paradigm of syntheticity and for a necessary paradigm of vagueness. This is why
I conceive this book as an attempt to develop what they started. To lose the anti-Kantian
attitude intrinsic to pragmatism means to lose a historical truth but, above all, the core of
an  alternative  very  different  from those  that  we  saw during  the  twentieth  century.
Certainly,  as  Colapietro  points  out,  this  alternative  has  a  Hegelian  tone,  as  classic
pragmatists had, but it can elaborate on change and action with the richness of modern
mathematical  developments  of  continuity  and  sophisticated  phenomenology  and
semiotics.4 All tools that somehow come from classic pragmatism in general and from
Peirce’s pragmatism in particular, and that should get this proposal out of the Hegelian
spin.
10 Finally,  in  a  substantial  way,  I  agree  with Lucia  Santaella  and Vincent  Colapietro  in
indicating  the  goal  of  pragmatism  in  the  growth  of  concrete  reasonableness  and
humanity.  Lucia  Santaella  ascribes  that  growth to the path of  normative sciences  as
drawn by Peirce and well explained by Lucia in her piece. Vincent Colapietro ascribes to
Peirce a methodological outcome that makes us historical, practical, dramatic developers
of critical knowledge. I can understand their positions and I greatly admire their work
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and attempts. Nonetheless, I think they miss, or they cannot share, the need for a new
pattern  of  knowledge,  of  a  new  definition  of  the  synthetic  paradigm.  This  partial
incomprehension explains why they focus on the proposal of gesture more than on the
paradigm of which gestures want to be a tool. When Colapietro shortly comments on the
need of a different paradigm of reasoning, he points out that he prefers
the adjective synechistic to synthetic, since it shifts the focus from a methodological
activity (the acts, processes, and procedures by which syntheses are achieved) to (in
the first instance) a phenomenological task, one that of describing with painstaking
accuracy  genuine  continua  and,  for  that  matter,  degenerate  ones  as  well.
(Colapietro 2016: 168)
11 I agree that this was also Peirce’s attitude and there is no question about the fact that this
was  Peirce’s  aim.  Colapietro  is  one  of  the  greatest  readers  of  Peirce  because  he
understands this point in its deepest implications. But my project is not Peirce’s. This is
exactly  the  point  in  which  our  projects  depart  because  he  wants  to  give  a  precise
theoretical description of our practices, while I underline that practices are a (synthetic)
theoresis.  That is why we can detect their inherent rationality and I think that Peirce,
beyond his intentions, elaborated tools apt to this task. Lucia Santaella, instead, affirms
that Peirce was already very close to this perspective and that the indication of summum
bonum as concrete reasonableness shows this vicinity as well as the distance of Peirce’s
project from any form of rationalism. I am profoundly convinced of her conclusion about
this latter point, at least as far as the project is concerned. I only hope to provide a better
account in order to advance the first.
 
2. Gestures
12 As for the proposal of “complete and incomplete gestures” as tools of a new definition of
a synthetic paradigm, comments and suggestions are really powerful and interesting.
13 Mathias Girel’s question whether “complete gestures” can be accepted as paradigm for
any kind of gestures and, more critically, Vincent Colapietro’s remark of the Herculean
task that gestures have in my account raise the fundamental topic of complete gestures as
tools of synthetic knowledge. I think that the acceptance of this proposal largely depends
on the semiotic study of mathematics that I presented in Chapter 3 and on the acceptance
(at least) of the need for a different synthetic paradigm, which is the outcome of the work
of Fernando Zalamea.5 In an endnote of the book I explain that French philosophers of
mathematics as Cavaillès and Châtelet used the same term “gesture” to indicate a new
form of mathematical constructivism.6 Having had the chance to spend some time in
Paris, the last year, in order to present the book at the École Normale Supérieure, I could
deepen  the  reading  of  those  interesting  thinkers.  The  refusal  of  a-priorism,  the
underlying of the practical action that gesture implies in creating mathematics, the need
of structural rules for these actions, the synthetic power of the outcome of gestures are
already present in their work. Cavaillès summarizes this description of mathematics with
the wonderful expression: “attraper le geste et pouvoir continuer” (to grasp the gesture and
to be able to go ahead). Certainly, as Mathias seems to hint at, most of them keep the
gestures within the limit of mathematics while The Philosophy of Gesture wants to broaden
gestures to regular experience. Somehow, it is what Châtelet foreshadowed in his work by
addressing the border  between regular  experience and mathematical  experience and
invoking a broader notion of reality and a different paradigm of reasoning. Moreover,
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Giuseppe  Longo  underlines  the  intertwining  between  the  material  conditions  of
possibility and the conceptual construction of mathematical gesture. Longo traces the
history of this phenomenological and semiotic interplay back to the Lascaux caves, where
primitive human beings invented the idea of border, a line that holds and limits, both
material  and conceptual.  Longo explores the idea of the universal into the particular
through Euclid’s drawing of a line, which is without thickness,  Lorenzetti’s paintings,
Galileo’s principle of inertia, Riemann surfaces, Grothendieck’s geometry. Mathematical
constructions are rooted into a “practice of gesture” that goes far beyond any possible
formalization and it is connected with human political and social living. The project of
“complete gesture” stands or falls with this philosophical conception of mathematical
constructivism.
14 One crucial objection to my project is one raised by Vincent Colapietro. Isn’t it a paradox
that I want to propose a synthetic tool and I describe it analytically? Indeed, it is an ironic
paradox, but not an inconsistency. In the book, I ask myself the same question (142). I
think that this paradox shows the necessity of analysis as well. Reasoning is a pendulum
between different paradigms of reasoning: the analytic,  the synthetic,  and the vague.
Analysis and synthesis are the extremities of the pendulum: we cannot explain synthesis
with  words  except  by  way  of  analysis.  Otherwise,  we  have  to  perform  gestures.
Performance is not only an illustration (as Colapietro points out) but also an embodiment
of syntheticity. I think that Colapietro’s comments help me to state better where I see the
novelty of this proposal. For example, when he says that our understating of gestures “is
practical, not theoretical” he seems to rely again on a practical/theoretical distinction. I
can understand this attitude. Classic pragmatists showed the same cautiousness. And so
did  I.  However,  I  saw  that  keeping  this  attitude  implies  eventually  to  accept  the
rationalist project and, even with many sophisticated adjustments – like Wittgenstein’s
and Colapietro’s – it means to stay only within the rationalist, analytic track designed by
Kant.
15 As for indefiniteness and incompleteness, a major criticism by Colapietro is the implied
teleology of gestures and their possible completion. Colapietro is right in pointing out the
importance of  incompletion and indefiniteness  of  semiosis.  Gestures  are  actions  that
carry on a meaning, but meaning has not to be neither static nor unique. However, this
plurality does not mean arbitrariness: gestures carry on a direction in which we have to
look for the interpretative meaning. In this direction, we can find many similar meanings,
all of them already implied in the gesture. When Sraffa performed his famous gesture, he
wanted to indicate a problem in Wittgenstein’s conception. He translated his gesture in a
question:  “how  can  you  formalize  this?”  but  there  might  have  been  several  other
translations (“I  don’t care at all  about your formalization,” for example),  all  of  them
gathered  around  the  vague  idea  of  a  difference  between  what  you  can  and  cannot
formalize.  The  consequences  of  the  gesture  and  its  interpretation  could  have  been
different as well.  It  determined a profound self-criticism but it  could also provoke a
simple  reformulation  of  the  previous  theory.  However,  you  could  not  interpret  that
gesture as “your theory was perfect” or “your theory perfectly explains what I have just
done.”  Teleology  does  not  imply  the  straitjacket  of  a  univocal  interpretation  but  a
direction of meaning.
16 The gesture I elaborated works on the same continuity of change that Peirce elaborates
when he describes a perfect sign (Ch. 3 and Colapietro 2016: 165-6, 171-2). The difference
is  that  there  are  some ordinary  conversations  that  are  more  important  than others
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because  they let  us  know something new.  Those  are  complete  gestures,  like  Sraffa’s
conversation with Wittgenstein. I understand Vincent’s fear of completion or perfection
as a  moral  statement or  as  a  static  final  state,  but  gestures are only conserving the
implicit  teleology  that  they  receive  from  their  symbolic  part.  Talking  of  complete
gestures is not thinking about them as eternal. They are only powerful moments and they
determine  our  changes  in  knowledge  and  habits  but  they  are  in  any  case  passing
moments of our lives. The philosophy of gestures explains why certain gestures are so
powerful  and  significant  to  our  knowledge  (complete  gestures)  and  others  are  only
accompanying words or are helping us to make our meaning clear. Incomplete gestures
have their own synthetic function and their own power. I did not elaborate too much on
this, and I tried an elementary version of it playing with the three main kinds of signs
(icons, indices, and symbols) whereas a full elaboration should involve all 59049 kinds of
signs that Peirce counted on. I was more interested in the change of paradigm and in the
main conception of the synthetic tool, but I hope some scholar will undertake such an
immense semiotic work.
17 Besides,  I  am  convinced  that  Colapietro’s  insight  on  incompleteness  finds  a  more
profound account in the need of a vague paradigm of reasoning and in the transition
between this latter and the other two paradigms. Vague reasoning is possibly the richest
one,  the one from which any other  reasoning and paradigm of  reasoning stem.  The
incompletion that we find there is really uberous, but – as I also say in the conclusions of
the book – we need a profound research to get to vagueness through a vague tool just like




18 Girel, Guglielminetti, and Colapietro ask some important questions on gestures and I will
try to reply to them in the remainder of this rejoinder.
19 1.  I  return  for  a  moment  on  Sraffa’s  gesture.  What  is  the  relationship  between
gesticulation,  or the usual  sense of  “gesturing,” and my sense of  gesture? There is  a
difference but also a relation between accompanying the words by hands and my idea of
gesture  as  “action  that  carries  on  a  meaning.”  To  be  precise,  gesticulating  is  an
incomplete gesture that carries on meaning and makes us know something new in a very
small amount. Gesticulating is an involuntary act that follows our words. However, the
root of gesticulating is indeed in acts that try to vehicle a meaning. When I do not succeed
in saying something, I try to perform it by hands, namely by iconizing and indicalizing
the symbolic function of words.  As I  explain at p.  78 of the book, the usual sense of
“gesturing” is indeed an incomplete gesture that fosters information. Moreover, as Ong
taught us, in gesturing we see what remains of an oral culture, which was probably closer
to recognize the importance of a real synthetic paradigm based on meaningful actions.
Writing greatly helped the development of analyticity, even though there is no symmetry
between the two phenomena. We can detect syntheticity in writing as well as in orality,
as I pointed out in Chapter 7.
20 2. Is discontinuity neglected and experience shadowed by my focusing on continuity?
Enrico Guglielminetti,  whose very interesting philosophy of “adding” has much to do
with William James and pragmatism,7 suggests that in the rupture, in the breaking there
is the chance of a real development (and event). This important question gives me the
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chance to write some words on Peirce’s attempts to formulate a theory of continuity,
which would allow for discontinuities. This theory was the bedrock of pragmatism as it is
the bedrock of the philosophy of gesture. In his late years, Peirce was trying to show how
continuity  can be  thought  of  without  falling into  both idealism and analytic  metric,
namely how it can include discontinuity without deleting existential discontinuities and
without considering Cantor’s and Russell’s paradoxes as ending points of inquiry. Peirce
gave some characteristics of this perfect continuum, whose mathematical,  topological
demonstration has been given only recently by Francisco Vargas, from Zalamea’s school
of mathematics. Mathematical demonstration shows the embodiment of possibilities into
actual points and accounts for this transition among modalities that I find crucial for
synthesis.  Continuity  and  transition  among  modalities  are  no  straitjackets.  Our
comprehension  moves  among  modalities,  and  a  “necessary”  meaning  opens  up  new
possibilities.  Here,  the articulation  of  synthesis  relies  on  Peirce’s  and  Scotus’
interpretation of reality as a comprehensive modal development, of which actuality is
only one realization.  This  does not  mean to take out  any value to the inderministic
sporting of actuality, which is a fruit of freedom and creativity as all our original gestures
are (cf. Peirce’s firstness and tychism).
 
4. Personality and Sociality
21 Mathias Girel asks two very interesting questions about the recognizing of identity during
changes. Is that mechanical or we “can” decide somehow to endorse or not to endorse a
“gesture”? So, what is the role of personality and sociality?
22 The book wants to underline the case in which complete gestures happen as ideal cases.
When gestures are “complete” we are really knowing something new and there is no
distance between interior and exterior,  personal and social  aspect.  In the moment of
assent to a proposed gesture author and interpreter find their unity (97). I consider this
unity  as  a  fulfilment  of  the  pragmatist  rejection of  dualisms and an embodiment  in
regular life of Peirce’s rich realism in which exteriority and interiority belong to a whole
continuum of reality. However, these complete gestures are rare. More often, gestures are
incomplete and in incompletion the drama of personality as individuality emerges in a
way that seems to be isolated. It arises when we perform incomplete gestures and it arises
when we are about to perform a complete gesture, but we did not perform it yet. We
would  not  be  so  satisfied  when  we  perform a  complete  gesture,  if  it  were  not  the
achievement or the event that completes a long struggle. Now, Mathias Girel’s question is
whether during this struggle there is an ontological status of personality and sociality. I
was cautious in the book and I am cautious now. Certainly, from an epistemic standpoint,
our personality is a fruit of previous complete gestures and it is a struggle to achieve new
ones. And, certainly, gestures are exterior as interior and, therefore, as I underlined in
the  book  and  Girel  noticed  in  his  careful  reading,  they  provide  a  better  but  not
contrastive  theory  for  Mead’s  conversation  of  gestures.  If  I  am  not  sure  about  the
possibility of an a-aposteriori metaphysics that would account for the ontological side of
personality  and  sociality  formed  by  complete  gestures,  I  am  sure  that  the  entire
philosophy of gesture confirms that reality is intrinsically communicative. The Self is an
answer to an appeal of the social  and not an isolated gem that can arbitrary decide.
Certainly,  the mystery about  the source of  the assent,  about  the rational  instinct  or
human heart remains. Peirce somehow answers by saying that all instincts are fruit of a
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long evolution, but I think that as much as this answer is convincing for explaining the
phylogenesis of our communicative Self, I am not sure it accounts for the ontogenesis
completely. But this is certainly a good question for any further study on gestures.
 
5. Heaven
23 Would our gestures be eternal? Could we say that at least for complete gestures? Would
JFK discourse remain in heaven? Guglielminetti correctly asks for a metaphysical and
even theological dimension of gestures. I excluded those dimensions from this book not
because they are not interesting but because I do not have tools for saying something that
is more than a wishful will. Certainly, the entanglement between gestures and ontology
or gestures and metaphysics is a task to undertake. For now, I underlined their epistemic
value and I considered gestures as temporary tools of reasoning when reasoning wants to
detect an identity through change, namely when it can grasp anything new. As I indicated
in the conclusions of the book, I  think that a complicated but intriguing a posteriori
metaphysics was in the pragmatists’ chords. However, I think I will postpone this study to
after the more important research on vague reasoning. For now, heaven can wait.
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NOTES
1. Pennac 1992.
2. As Pihlstrom observes, Gava’s & Stern’s book (2016) was not published when I wrote the book,
but I used as reference Gava 2014. Gava and I discussed the issue of Peirce’s Kantism or anti-
Kantism in a seminar at École Normale Supérieure in June 2015. In the book I briefly touch also
upon Brandom, Hookway,  and Misak as well.  Cf.  also the treatment of  those readings in the
introduction of Calcaterra, Maddalena, & Marchetti 2015.
3. As  it  is  well  known, Dewey  even  hinted  to  Kantism  as  a  philosophical  root  of  German
imperialism  (see  Dewey  1915).  Although  he  might  have  exaggerated,  drawing  political
implications  from  more  abstract  philosophies  remains  a  legitimate  practice.  Many  harsh
comments are also in Peirce’s late manuscripts 1908-14 (cf. Maddalena 2003). 
4. See Zalamea 2012a and 2012b. 
5. See also Maddalena & Zalamea 2012.
6. It is important to recall, as Girel does, the important studies on the practice of mathematics in
Chauviré 2008.
7. Guglielminetti 2016. 
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